Laurent Mathevet is an Assistant Professor in the department of Economics at New York University. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. from the California Institute of Technology and a B.S. from the Universite of Saint-Etienne, France. Before joining NYU, he taught at the University of Texas at Austin.
The focus of his research has been game theory, mechanism design, and recently information design. Information design investigates how to design incentives through information disclosure. For example, suppose that you are a well-intentioned advisor (like a doctor, a parent, etc.). Should you always reveal the whole truth (to your patient, your child, etc.)? In general, if you knew something that a group of people did not, how could you use this information to incentivize them to do something? Prof. Mathevet and his co-authors answer the first question in a paper entitled “Disclosure to a Psychological Audience,” and they adopt a belief-based perspective to study the latter in “Information Design: The Epistemic Approach.”
(with Jacopo Perego and Ina Taneva), August 2017.
(with Elliot Lipnowski), March 2017.
(with David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti), In progress.
(with Elliot Lipnowski and Dong Wei), In progress.
(with Julian Romero), November 2014
(with Elliot Lipnowski), Conditionally Accepted, AEJ: Microeconomics, March 2017.
Conditionally Accepted, Games and Economic Behavior, May 2017. (Supplementary material).
Games and Economic Behavior, volume 85, 2014, 252-271.
Journal of Economic Theory, volume 148, 2013, 2583-2619.
Games and Economic Behavior, volume 82, November 2013, 327–349.
Theoretical Economics, volume 7 (3), 2012, 609-443.
Theoretical Economics, volume 5 (3), 2010, 403-443.
Economic Theory, volume 42 (3), 2010, 539-563.
(with Matthew O. Jackson and Kyle Mattes), Quarterly Journal of Political Science, volume 42 (3), 2010, 539-563.
with multiple co-authors (Brett Gordon, Paul Ellickson and Ron Borkovsky were the principal organizers), Marketing Letters, 2014.