I'm Laurent A. Mathevet

Asst Professor of Economics

  • Address NYU Dept. of Economics
    19 W. 4th St., 6FL, New York, NY 10012
  • E-mail lmath@nyu.edu
  • Phone (212) 998 8934


Laurent Mathevet is an Assistant Professor in the department of Economics at New York University. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. from the California Institute of Technology and a B.S. from the Universite of Saint-Etienne, France. Before joining NYU, he taught at the University of Texas at Austin.

The focus of his research has been game theory, mechanism design, and recently information design. Information design investigates how to design incentives through information disclosure. For example, suppose that you are a well-intentioned advisor (like a doctor, a parent, etc.). Should you always reveal the whole truth (to your patient, your child, etc.)? In general, if you knew something that a group of people did not, how could you use this information to incentivize them to do something? Prof. Mathevet and his co-authors answer the first question in a paper entitled “Disclosure to a Psychological Audience,” and they adopt a belief-based perspective to study the latter in “Information Design: The Epistemic Approach.”


In Progress

"Disclosure to a Psychological Audience",

(with Elliot Lipnowski), R&R AEJ: Microeconomics, March 2017.

"An Axiomatization of Plays in Repeated Games",

R&R Games and Economic Behavior, July 2016. (Some supplementary material is available).

"On Information Design in Games",

(with Jacopo Perego and Ina Taneva), February 2017.

"Simplifying Bayesian Persuasion",

(with Elliot Lipnowski), March 2017.

"Reputational Information Design",

(with David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti), In progress.

"Strategic Data Omission",

(with Elliot Lipnowski and Dong Wei), In progress.


"Beliefs and Rationalizability in Games with Complementarities",

Games and Economic Behavior, volume 85, 2014, 252-271.

"Tractable Dynamic Global Games and Applications", (with Jakub Steiner),

Journal of Economic Theory, volume 148, 2013, 2583-2619.

"Finite Supermodular Design with Interdependent Valuations", (with Ina Taneva),

Games and Economic Behavior, volume 82, November 2013, 327–349.

"Designing Stable Mechanisms in Economic Environments", (with Paul J. Healy),

Theoretical Economics, volume 7 (3), 2012, 609-443.

"Supermodular Mechanism Design",

Theoretical Economics, volume 5 (3), 2010, 403-443.

"A Contraction Principle for Finite Global Games",

Economic Theory, volume 42 (3), 2010, 539-563.

"Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes",

(with Matthew O. Jackson and Kyle Mattes), Quarterly Journal of Political Science, volume 42 (3), 2010, 539-563.

"Multiplicity of Equilibria and Information Structures in Empirical Games",

with multiple co-authors (Brett Gordon, Paul Ellickson and Ron Borkovsky were the principal organizers), Marketing Letters, 2014.